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Tl1i:-: an ;wtI1111 for p<·r:-:mial i11,juri<':-: lirnught by 
:111 ;i 11111!< il 1i l1· I 1:ii nt<·r <l'..'.·ain:-:t <lll autorno1Ji!1• rnanufac-
11i 1 ··r h;1..,1·d 111J11ll 1wgli.'..'.·1·111·1· in tliP lle:-:ig11 of an auto-
111111 Ii I I'. 
Tl1i:-' l':t:-'1' \• tri1·d to :1 in the lo\\'l'l" eonrt, the 
11. I l. l·'1·:1!1k \\"ilkin:-:, 11n·:-:i11inp:. Trial 
111 :1 11 r;b·I ;1:1d .ii'.1 llt in LtY(ll' 01" 11H· dl'f1•1111nnt. 
.\l<>tion l"l)r Xl'\\. Trial wa:-: dt>nie<L This 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT OX 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of 
Dismissal. 
STATE.MENT OF I11ACTS 
Appellant claims that the facts do not support tlw 
verdict and then proceeds to recite that vPrsion of th(• 
facts least favorahle to th<· YN<lid. 
HowevPr, in this ap1wal th<' <·vi<l<'Jw<· i:-: of prirnar:-
importance only to Point Tl!. H<·spond<·nt \\·ill, th<•r(·-
fore, rectify A1Jpellant's version of th<· fads 1u1d<'r tltnt 
point. 
POINT L THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Tlw plaintiff lms<•d ltis (•as<> llpoll iwglig«•Jlc-(•, Jl()t upon 
strict liabilifr. He all<•g<•d in his Cornplai11t: 
"That the <l<·frndant was rn•glig<'nt, can•less 
and heedless in the rnanuf'adnn• and d(•sign of 
the said 19GG Chl•vrold lrnpala in the· f'ollo\\·ing 
partiC'ulars: 
(a) tl1at thP <h•sig-n and arrangP1rn·nt of 
tl1P torqu<' tPnsion rod and tension bar 
µ;11i<l<' on th<· l!Jtiti frnpala station wagon was 
high J:; dang<·rnus to th" bodily safl-'ty and 
lif'!' of 1wrson \\·ho rnight he called upon 
to l'<'lllO\"<' tail g-ah• assPrnhly for the 
JHHpos1·s of n•pai r or for otlu•r purposes. 
(b) that th<· dangl-'rous arrangPrnent of 
tlH· torqrn• tPnsion rod assembly constituted 
a hidd1·n da11gl'r. 
( c·) that thc•n· was no warning provided 
any\\ l1H1· on said station \\·agon or else-
\\ l1t·rc· to in form thP plaintiff or make known 
to him th<' <·xistPnC<' of such hidden danger 
ancl tl1<' pn·('autions nPcPssary to avoid seri-
ous li0<li injury." ( R. 1, :2). 
Plaintiff all<·g<·<l in his Complaint also that those 
srw!'if'i<' J1C',!..dig-1·nt ads and omissions directly and prox-
<·ausPd his injnri!'s (R. :2). 
TJ1p d1·f'<·n<lant in its .\ns\\'PI' dPnied negligPnce and 
assc•rt.·d th<' d<'ft.nsPs of eontrilmtory nPg-
liL;c·rn·(' and assumption of risk (R. G). 
'1''11· plaintiff suln11itt<•d IntP1Togatories to which 
( )Jijc·d ions and .\ nsm•rs \\·<·n· IIJ<Hl<'. The dPfrndant took 
d1·positions .. \ l'l"drial <·onf' .. r<>11<'<' \\·as lwld lwfore the 
llo11orahl<' Bryant II. Croft. A Pn•trial ordPr was en-
tPn·d sdti11g forth tl1<' <·ontt•11tions and isstws in this 
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''Plaintiff eonten<ls that tlH• d<>f Prnlnnt was 
negligPnt in onP or 111on• of th<> following par-
tienlars: 
] . 1'hat tlw dt>sig11 and of th1· 
tonpw t<•nsion r0<l and te11sion liar gnid" 
on the said station wagon \\'as highh· 
dangr-rous to hodil!- saf°<'t» and lil't· of 
any person who 111igltt lw eall<·<l upon to 
rt-'lllO\"<' tlit• tail gatt• asst•111lil:-· for llH· 
pnrpos<•s of rt-pair or for oth<T purposvs. 
1'hat tlw dang<·rous arrnng<·111rnt of tlw 
torqlH' t<'nsion rod ass<•111hl!· C'onstitut<·d 
[l hi<ld<•n dang<·r. 
3. 1'liat tll(•n• was no warning provid<'d an_,._ 
\\"h<·n· on the station \ragon or t•ls1·-
,d1Pn' to inform tlw plaintiff or to 1nak1· 
known to him 1lw <·xist<·n<'<' of su<'l1 hiddt·11 
dangPr and thP Jll"(•eanio11s rn·<·<·ssary 111 
avoid s<·rious hodil!· injury. 
''In addition to tlw fon•going parti<'ulars of' 
nt>gligPner, thP plaintiff' ask<·<l l<·m·<· to ad<l as <Ill 
of his cans<• of adio11 ti!(' dodri1w of r<'s 
ipsa loqnitur and sai(l leave \\·as grant<•d. 
"Plaintiff' fnrtltN <'<>11t<·1Hls tliat th<· 
genrP of the def<·ndant in tl1P partiC'ulars all<•gt•d 
and sPt forth ahov<· was the sol<• proximate rans<: 
of tlw injuri<•s to }Jlaintiff. 
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"'J)pf(·ndant <lPni<'S t]iat it was negligent in 
01w or 1nor<' thP particulars al1Pged, or at all, 
d(•ni('s tliat thP doctri1w of re8 ipsa ]oquitur ap-
pli(•s and f'mtl1<·r all<•g<·s that th<' plaintiff was 
guilt>- of <'ontrihutor>· rn•gligenee and that such 
<'ontriln1tor>· rn•gligPnr<' on the part of plaintiff 
\nls Pith<>r tlw sol<> proxi1natP causp or a contrib-
uting- prnxi111at<' caus<> of his injuries and that 
ht> <'annot in <·itlH·r 1·vPnt r<>cover. DPf Pndant al-
l1·g·1·s that tl1<' plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
rn·glig1·rwP in orw or rnorp of the following par-
t i(·nlars: 
(a) That hP failPd to follow the instructions 
in thP s<>1Tiet> manual or to eonsult it. 
( h) That h<' lo\\·Pr<>d th<> tail gatP beyond 
th1· limit of thP torq1w tPnsion rod and 
did so nndPr tPnsion without informing 
hirns\'lf or inquiring of tlw probable con-
( (') HP fail<•d to kP<'P a pro1wr lookout for 
th<' loeation of tlw torque tension rod as 
!1<' lowpn•<l th<' tail gatf>. 
( d) That h<' fail(•d to lwt>d warning of a frl-
lo\\· ('Jllj>lo>·(·(': JUllllPI>·· Ha>· rr<', and in re-
lllOVing the tail gatt> at all for the pur-
pos\' of painting it. 
( (') Plac<'<l hi111s(•lf in a position of danger 
in low1•ring thP tail gatP. 
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"The issnPs to he tried in this cast>, therdore, 
are as folloms: 
I. \Yas the d<·frndant negligPnt in on(• or 
lllOrP of th€' partirulan; all<>ged ancl set 
forth ahovP as Jtprns 1, 2 and :1. 
II. If so, was such nPgligern·<• on tlw part of 
defendant tlw sole ]Jroxirnatp eause of thP 
injury to plaintiff. 
llI. If so, what darnagPs, if any, would thP 
plaintiff he entitlPd to n·c·ov<'r. 
lY. Under the faets and ein·trnu.;tarn·es of th<' 
c·asP, does thP doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
apply. 
Y. \Vas thP plaintiff guilty of <'ontirilmtory 
negligPnC<' in on<' or rnon• of th<' partien-
lars alleged and set forth ahon• as Iterns 
(a), (h), (<'), (d) and (d. 
YI. If so, was snd1 eontrilmtor>· rn•glig(•JWP 
on the part of the plain ti ff <·ither tltP sok 
proximate• cans(• or a eontrihnting proxi-
mah• cause of the injury to th<· plaintiff." 
(R. 33-35) 
Rule 16, U.R.C. P. providPs rdative to prl'trial con-
frn·ncPs : 
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"Th(• <·ourt shall lllakP an ordPr whieh rPcites 
t 11(• ad ion tak<·n at tlH· <'Onfrr<'m'P, thf-' amend-
111"nt :-: allo\\'(•d to th1• pl1·;Hlings, and tlH-' agree-
111<·nt:-: 11iad(• h.\· ti)(' parti(•:-: as to any of tlw matters 
('onsid(·n·d, and \rhit'l1 limits tlH• issnPs for trial 
to tlio:-:(• not dispos1·d of h_\· admissions or agree-
11wnts of (·ciuns(·I: and stwh onlPr whPn entered 
('ontrnls 111<' s11lis<'q11<·11t <·ounw of the action/ 
t111lc·ss 111odi f'i<·d at tl1<' trial to pr<•vPnt manifest 
i 11.i ll st i (' ('. 
Th<· .\ pp('llant 111ad1· no n'qlwst for a modification 
of t]1p J>rdrial Ord('!" ('ith1•r at tlu· trial or at any other 
ti11lt'. 
J'laintiJTs n"<fll(':-:t<•<l ln:-:tnlC'tions to the jury sub-
111ittt·d tl1<· 11wrning of trial \\·1·n· all dirPctNl toward 
111·! ... !:li!..'.t'll<'t'. l'laintiff's B('(fll<':-:tPd Tn:-:tn1f'tion No. 1 told 
tli1· jur"'_\· it \ms th<· duty of the defPndant to infonn users 
ol' any risks not oh:-:1Tn1hll' and that tlw failurf' 
to dci so would l'on:-:titut<• 1wglig<'nc·P. (R . .+3). 
PlaintifTs HPqll<'StPd lnstrnetion Xo. :2 told the jury 
it \\·as tl11· d1·frnda11t's duty to <'lirninate dangers which 
irl\'oh·P i11(•xp1•nsiYt' !llodif'ieations of clesii-,rn and that the 
l'ailnn· to do :-:o \\·011111 eonstitnfr n<'gligt>nCP (R. .+.+). 
Both of t])(':-:<· instructions \\'(']'(' gin•n in part hy the 
( '011 rt. 
H.\· HP(pu·st\'d ln:-:trndion Xo. 4 the plaintiff asked 
tl1<• Court to L'Xplain that h<' \\·as not rPquirPd to guard 
8 
against dangc>r in plact>s whPre it 1s not PXJH•ete<l to lJe 
(R. 4G). This instrudion was giYrn in part. 
X 0 instructions basl'U Upon t}w dodriJIP or st rid lia-
bility wen) suhmitt(•(l to th(• <'ourt. <·ouns<'l !'or 
the plaintiff did n·qn<>st tlw eourt to instnH't tlw jury 
that the d0frndant had fai !Pd to sustain its hunl(•JI o!' 
lffoof on thP dd<>nse of eontrilmtory rn·1rli <r<'n<·<· h<' di<! • M h ' 
not request that tontrilmtor>· 1wg·ligc•nc·1• lH• Pli111inat1·d 
of its not <"onstituting a l<·µ:al dd"Pnsc· (It :il ). 
[n Instrucion Xo. 10 th<• court told th<• jury tliat 
tlH• mPl'l' faet an ac-<'id(•nt happ<·rn·<l did 11ot prov<• that 
Pitlwr tlH• plaintiff' or th<· d<·frndant \\'as nq.dig<·nt 
65r Xo 0xct>ption was tak<'n to this instrndion. 
ln its lnstrudion Xo. 11 th(• <'Ollrt d<·ri1wd nq.;li 
crence contrilrntory npo·liO'('ll<'(' ordinan· <·an· arnl J>l'O\:-
t:> ' '"' r. h ' . 
imate cause (R. G5). X o Pxeeiition ,,·as takc·n to tl1is 
instruction. 
In its Instrnetion Xo. 13, th<• <'<>nrt told tlH· jmy 
that a mannfaetnn•r \\·as n•quin•d to <'X<'r<'i:-:<· ordi1wr:-· 
ean· in tlw rnanufadun• of anto111ohil<•s (It li!I). Xo <''.:-
e<'ption was tak<·n to this instnwtion. 
From th(' ('Ollllll<'JH'('lll<'Jlt or this adion until aft< r 
it was submitted to th<· jury t\rn y<·ars lat<·r, both ti)(' 
plaintiff and tlw dc,frndant n·li<'<l upon Im,· 
11_,. Iloo;wr r. 01'1/l'rrtl J!otors Crn;Joration, 123 Utah G15, 
:.'.liO J>.:.'.d :->+!) ( l!J:->:l) as lwing th<• law of this easP. l!ooper 
l1olds tl1at a lll<.lllul'adnn·r's liability rPstf; upon negli-
l!:• •Jl('('. 
It is fm1<1an11·11tal that a part.\- may not attempt to 
/il'!C:llad•· tlw tr:al ('Olirt of()]](' thf'OJ'_\' and, if llnSUCCPSS-
1'111. a(h·mw" a di i"J'<·n·11t tht'ory 011 app<'al. If the law 
'' 1·11· ntl11•n\·is(•, a trial \\"<mid IH• a ll!PrP proving ground 
and ;1pp<·llatt· pro1·1·du11· a sliarnhl<·s. 
T lH · au ti 10 r it i <·s an.· n Ullll' rnus Lu t ei tation of two 
l 1 () u Id I).(. :-: ll r fit· i I• ll t : 
I 
.:\l<1th·r:-: 111·itl1(•r rais1·d in thl· plPadings nor put 
tll i:-:su1· at tlll' trial eannot IH' eonsicl<•n•d for th,3 
l'i rst ti111<· on app1·al. /11 re f,'state of E'kker, 19 rtah 
:.'.d + 1 +. +:l:.'. P.:.'.d. +:-> ( 1 %/). 
A Jl<l rt:· \\·lio h:· Iii:-: mm pl1·adings, PvidPncP and 
n·11111·st<·d instrudions tri1·s and rests his casP upon 
a <"ntain tl11·111:· is hound l>y that theory which tht>n 
IH·t·o11w:-: 1li1· b\1· ol' tl1l' <'HS!' and eannot upon appf'al 
sl1il't to <11wfl}('r tl11•or;· or position. Petti11:1ill r. PN-
l.i11'. :.'. 1·tali :!d :!(iii,:!/:.'. P.:!d JSj (Hl:i-J.). 
POI:\'T II. THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IS 
>:()T TIIE L\ \\' OF l'T:\H. 
10 
The doctrine of striet liabiliy has m'ver lw<>n ado1Jted 
in Utah and is only a minority rule in Anwriran juris-
dirtiom; as a \\·hohi. Tlw statt>s of California, Gn'e1rnzan 
L Yulw Pmrer Products, Inc., 29 Cal. 2d -ri, P.2ll 
S97 (UWO), Comwctient, nart711rnrt r. flurgio (Conn. 
l9G5) 2Hi A.2d 189, Illinois, Surnrfo L TT'liitc Motor Co., 
3:2 111. 2d ()121, 210 :M rn2 (19<i5), Kt>ntueky, C. D. 
llerme. Inc. r. T1rny Co., 29-1- 8.\\'. 2d :5:3+ (195<>), 
Jle1111i11,qson L Hloomfi<'lrl Jllotors. !lie., 32 "0: .• J. 
:158, Hil A.2d G9 (19()0), Ne\\· York, Gold!J!'rq I'. Kolls-
man Insnrmrnt Corp .. 12 K.Y. 2d +:32. 191 N.K 2d 1Rl 
( 19G3) and Oklahoma, Marat71011 flattery Co. r. Kilpat-
rick, CCR Products Liability Paragraph 5501 
(19G5) appear to lw the only Ameriean jurisdictions t>Ill-
hraeing- strict liability. En•n its arrhit<>c·t, Dean Pross .. r, 
elairns only H jnris<lietions. 
SPction -1-02A of tlw HPstatP!ll(•nt of th<• Law of Torts 
( 8Pcond), puhlislwd in 19()5 hy the Anwrica.n l ... aw lnsti-
tutt> Pxt<·ndP<l its statp11wnt of tlw law as appli<>d to food 
and products for intimate us<" to all pro<luets. 
Th<' dP('isions did not and do not justi I\ that (•xfrnsim1. 
Th(• function of tlH· Arn(•f'i('an La\\· I nstitnt<• is to 
stat<· what th<> g<·n<•ral <·mm11on law of' tlw l 'nit<"<l Stat1•s 
i:-:, not what it rnay h<'<'OllH'. This should lw i111pli<·it in 
th(• tPrrn ''R<>state>mPnt" hut D<·an Pross<'!' who is n•-
sponsihl<> for SN·tion -1-0:2A himsdf aC'knowl('dgl's that 
11 
S(·<·l ion -W'.2.\ statPs onl!· a minority rule. In urging its 
ndoption upon th(• rnernlwrship of the Anwrican Law 
InstitntP, DPan J>ross<T said: 
"Xo on<' lias to he any sPer or sooth-sayer to 
for<'S('<' that this is lweorning the law of the im-
111<·diat<' futurP 
"I mmld Y<·ntnn• to prt>dict that in another 
;)() !·<·ars has fair ehanees of becoming a ma-
jority ml<· in thP rnitPd Stat<•s, ... " (-n ALI 
ProePrdings, 1 %+ ( 19()5), p. 8;}0-51.) 
f n l'tah rnanufadun·rs are liable only if negligent. 
TltP lcrn· of l-tah is as sPt forth in Hooper v. GPneral 
.lfolnrs ('orporafio11, supra, whPrP tlw eourt said: 
"Thus, to irnpose liability on an assembler 
of an auto111nhilP ePrtain nt>eessary elP11ients must 
h1• !lladP out. Plaintiff is reqnin•d to shffw: ( 1) 
a d(•!\·div(• "·l1<>rl at the tiinr of automobile assem-
hI:·: ( :2) sueh dPfret lwing- diseoverahle by reason-
ahl<· im;pPction: (:1) injury eaused by the failure 
of thP 'rh(•Pl du<· to it:-: df•fective eondition.'' 
I•'nrtlwrmon·,<·,·pn if it hP as:-;umt>d for purposes of 
ar.i..:w1wnt that tl1<· dodri1w of strict should b<•-
<·0111<' tl1e law of ('tali, that doetrin<' would not preclude 
<·Yidt>nC'P of rnisu:-;<' or ahnon11al u:-;<>. Contributory neg-
li;.;<·m·<· in tltat sP11s<' i:-; a defense to an aetion based upon 
lm·:u·li of \\·anant:·, J)el!isr)}I r. Senrs, Rorlmck and Co. 
(Ill Cir. 1%:!) F.:?<1. :i-l:l or striet Swain L 
12 
Boeing Airplane Co., (2 Cir. 19G-!) 3;37 F.'.2d 9-10, 
fense withdrawn by defendant). 
POINT III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO SUBi\IIT THAT ISSUE 
TO THE JURY. 
"jlr. Simpson lwp;an working around <'ars ·when 11" 
"-as 11 yPars old, ht>lping his fat11c•r who was abo a <·ar 
paintt>r (R. He took auto mPehani('s \\·hen a soplw-
more at Granite High 8C'hool (R. During this <·ours" 
lw hermne familiar with tlw us!' of sP1Ti('P 111mrnals. (H 
319). 'Ylwn a junior, hl' 1rnrk<·d for Litten's Bod:· Shop 
doing both hod:· work and painting ( H. :!95. :ill). 
Brtwe<·n his junior and s<'1110r rs, h<' \\'Pl'kPd at 
Capital ChnTolt't as a ]>ainter ( H. :!9;'"l) and wh<·11 111· 
graduated from high se11ool in .Jmw, 1!Hil, lw w<'nt tu 
work full-time at Capital Cheyrolf't ( R. :!97). 
Simpson liacl l><,<'11 painting <'ars f'ull-ti1n<• u10n• 
than four years lwfon· tl1is ae<·id('nt o<·<·ll!T<'<L f J,. "'11." 
hoth trained and exp(•ri<·rn·<·<L 11 <' eould ohsl'l'n- and 
appn·riat<• n1<>ehanieal r<'lationsliips. 
At the tim<· of the aeeidPnt, lw \\·a;-; prq1aring to paint 
tlH· tail gatP of a J 9(iG Chv\Trolet station \nl,i_;On. rro avoid 
tlw npeessity of masking- thP ehrou1<• tail µ;at<' support!', 
he rPrnnY<>d the srn•ws attaehing th(• support to the tuil 
!..'.·att· and. \\·ith the as:-;istaneP of a fellow <·mployee, Ray 
l>i·an l ·r··. lo\\·l'rPd th<· tail gatP helow the horiz.ontal 
far to }H'l"lllit tlw torqrn .. rod to eseape from 
it,; n·tainn and strikt> r. Sirnpson i11 t!H• l1<>ad. 
1·. l. n· tPstifo·d hi• was askPd h.'· r. Simpson for 
:t lwnd ( B. :.!10). r. Si11qJsm1 had n·111oy1·d thP supports 
;111d \\"(lS hol1linµ; tlH· tail gatP up. 1Ie told Hay rre that 
111· \ms ;..;oing to !Pt it d0\n1 and asked him to help R. 212) . 
. \s th('·'· lo\\·l'r<'d it. Ha.'· on th<· Jiass1·ng-er side and Simp-
son on tliP driY1·r sidt•, Ha.'· notiC'<>d that tlw torque rod 
\\·as at thP point \\·hpn• if thP tail g-atP was let down 
f11rtlwr it \rn11icl r·ornf .. ont of thP rPtainf-'r (R. 212). 
II(· :-:aid. "lfold it. I think that thing- therP is ahont to 
t·o1111• out of' th1· :-:ta:·." Simpson n•pliP<l. •'•Lpt's just }pt 
this dO\rn a littl1• 1110n·." ( H. :.!1:.!). As thp:· }pt tlw tail 
!..'.·at<' down f'urtl1<•r tl11• rod ram<> ont from tlH• retainer 
and :-:tnwk Simpson in th1• f'on,•head. l'r<' stat1•d it was 
1101 1·11sto111ar:· to n•1110Y<' tliP :-;npports to paint a tail 
'-'.;\(•· (I:. :.!J:l). 
i·n· 1·x1·n·i:-:e1l eantion than 
('\.t•Jt t liongh Si11qlson \ra:-: tlw orn• rpsponsihlP for tl11..• 
\\'(IJ'k. 
Si111pson knl'\\"" that thP tail gatP rontainP<l a mt>ehan-
1:-:1ll for rnnking it <'asi<'r to mis<' thr· tail gate (H. 331 ). 
I It• bw,,· tlii:-: 1111·1·krni:-:rn \\·a:-; a rod whi<'h workPd up and 
dO\rn i11:-:idl· a guid(• ( B. :i;i:n. lie a<'knmdt><lg-ed that tht• 
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working of fop l'()(l arnl µ:uidl' W\'I'<' "ohyio11s", "appar-
Pnt' arnl "notic<'ali!P'' (H. It wa::-; al:-:o appan·nt 
from tlu' l'()(l its1•ll' that is in('Ol'JHlrat1•d no t'<·at11r<· \\·l1i<"h 
\\·onld Jll'<'YPnt it from <"0111ing- frnm thP n·tain<·r ( H. :i:l-t ). 
To lw ol' n<·g·Jig·<·n<·<>, it is 11ot Jl<'<·<·:-:-
to antieipatP th(• pn•<"isP \\-a\· harm <·an IH'fall. 
Ht> adrnitt(•d that hP kll\'\\' that it' 11<· 
had dis<·omwd1•(l th1· n•taiiwr tli<·n· \\·onld haY<· h<·<·11 
no t<'nsion on th<> rod (H. ;3:m). II<> a('knm\·l<·dµ:('d that 
when warnt•<l by l"n·, h<' turn<·d i111111('diat<·ly arnl 
look<>d din·etly at th<• rod (H. :n1i). This is at l1·a:-:t 
circumstantial <·Yi<ll'rn'<' of an mnH<'Jl(•ss or tlw rod·:' 
propcn:-:iti<•s. 
Si111pson's t'XJH'l't \Yitrn·ss. Profrssor Brown, agT<·<·d 
that tlw fundion an<l or tli(' torqu<· J'()(l 
wt>n• oll\·ion:-:. 11 <' ti's ti fil'd 
A. 
Q. 
\\'011111 YOU (l<r]"(•(• \YitJ1 <r(•J](•ra]I\· t)l(• }J\ll"})()S\' 
.. r-"l h .. 
of thi:-; torsion rod is to rnakl' tlH• tail g-at1· 
<·a:-;iPr to rais<' ! 
Arnl wh<•n :•on first <•xa111in<·d tliP :rntOJnohil(• 
slio\Yll in tlw pl10tog-raphs, \\·as tl1<' loeation 
of tlw (•JJd or t liis torqll<' rod ohyio11s to you! 
f:<. • .. 
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Q. \\'as it ohyions to yon that thl' purpose of 
that was to aet in a s<>nse as a 
\\'as it oh\·ions to you that if tlw tail gate 
\\"(•]"(• lo\Y('n·<l lwyond tlw limit of the rod, 
that it would C'OllH' out of tlu.• rt'tained 
Q. '.\'as it ohyions to :mu that if it did come out 
of that rdainer, that it would eome out under 
t<·nsion' 
.\. I stron)..!·h· si1sp<·d('d this. It is a little bit 
di l'fi<"11lt to ];no\\. <·xa<"tl>· thP rPlationship of 
tl1<· sprin.!.'.' for<'<' as th<· hing-P IllOYf'S out. 
You k1ww th('n• had to }w some load on it; 
otl1<·n,·is" it <'ouldn't ad as a rountPr-halanee . 
. \. Y<·s. That is in it:-: horizontal position. Being 
lllll\'(•(l }H">'OTI<l thP horizontal fWSiton, yon 
111ig-ltt <·<>n<·('iYahly PX}J('<'t sorn<'thing. T woulrl 
(•xp1d it to IH' undPr tPnsion, hut it is not 
quit<' ol1Yious. 
(J_ .\ wl would l'X}ll'd th1• farther moved, 
tl11· !..:Tl·:d1·r th(' h·nsion, just likP wlH·n you 
pull a ho\\ . 
. \. Y(•s, althoud1 tht• llHllllll'I" in whieh tlw hingt• 
111ons 011t, it - it isn't a simplP 
<'\<'list· 1111·. it isn't a sirnpl(• pi\·ntPd hing-<'. 
,.. . 
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Q. And in working on any counter-balancing or 
counter-balance system, it is ordinarily neces-
sary to disarm the svstem brfore vou take 
it apart, isn't it? In. other words, ·take the 
load off of it before you take it apart. 
* * * 
A. That would appear to he prudent, yes." (R. 
155-158) 
Although Professor Brown could not visualize the 
exact effect of the offset hinge, the fact that the rod was 
under tension when the door was open ·was abundantly 
clear. 
Frank Anderson, age 58, Body Shop Manager, em-
ployed by Capital Chevrolet Company was 81h years 
and in the automobile service industry for 40 years, had 
general supervision over the painters and the body re-
pairmen (R. 171, 172, 173). 
He testified that the custom and practice would be 
to mask tpe tail gate supports and paint. It would not 
have been customary to remove them (R. 180). If it 
·were necessary to remove the supports, a body man 
would have done it (R. 181). 
\Vilby Hall, 0mployed at Capital ChPvorlet for 39 
years as paint foreman, testified that the practice and 
custom for painters would have been to mask the sup-
ports and paint tlw tail gafo and then if it \\'Pre neccissary 
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to remove a support, that job would have been turned 
over to the hody shop foreman \Vho would have asked 
one of the body men to do it. He said as long as he had 
had the shop they had not removed such supports (P. 
201). 
Don Victor \V el ch, employed by Bennett Ford at 
the time of the trial but at Capital at the time of the 
accident, had worked for ·Capital since 1951 (R. 205). 
He testified that the customary way would have been to 
mask the chrome and paint. Overspray on chrome can 
be removed wi.th thinner (R. 207). 
Contributory negligence by definition is a deviation 
from the way prudent men customarily act. Indeed, the 
standard of care derives from custom and practice unless 
from statutory mandate. 
Simpson himself acknowledges that the was not re-
quired to remove a door, a bumper, a grill or a tail gate; 
this was the responsibility of body men (R. 298, 349, 350). 
He admits he could have painted the tail gate from in-
side the car (R. 345). 
Although he familiarity with the precise way 
the tail gate was counter-balanced, he acknowledged that 
he knew the tail gate \Vas counter-balanced or had some 
mechanism to make it close (R. 3-1-9) and admitted he 
would not have opened a storm door, putting the closing 
18 
mechanism under tension and tlwn removing the mechan-
ism from the door (R. 3-±9). He admits he could have 
painted the tail gate without removing the supports (R. 
329) or by removing the support from one side at a 
time (R. 339). Unnecessarily departing from customary 
ways, with an appreciation of the potentiality of some 
harm, is contributory negligence. 
In addition to departing from the customary prac-
tice, Simpson failed to follow the directions in the Fisher 
Body Service Manual for the removal of the tail gate 
supports or the removal of the tail gate. 
That manual provided the following instructions: 
"TAJL GATE SUPPORT ASSEMBLIES 
Removal and Installations 
1. Open tail gate and support it in that posi-
ti on. 
2. Remove screws securmg support to tail 
gate ... 
* * * 
"TAIL GATE ASSEl\fBLY 
Removal and Installation 
1. Open tail gate . . 
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2. Raise tail gate to an approximate vertical 
position to relieve torque rod tension. Remove 
torque rod retainer attaching screws and remove 
retainer . . . " 
* * * 
Simpson kne'IV servire manuals were available at 
tlw office and knt>w that service manuals showed how to 
dismantle cars, yet he made no inquiry of anyone in the 
hody shop and no reference to the manual (R. 320, 326, 
E.x. 1). 
This evidence, and that of significant departure 
from customary practice, at the very least raised a jury 
question as to Simpson's contributory negligence. 
POINT IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING 
EXHIBITS 17 AND 18. 
Contrary to appellant's assertion, Exhibit 17 was 
not offered or received. Exhibit 18, the Fisher Body 
Service l\fanual, was properly admitt(•d in evidence. 
One of the claims \Yas that tlH'I'l' was no warning pro-
vided anvwliere on the station wagon or elsewhere to 
inform the plaintiff or make known to him the precau-
tions m'cessary to avoid serious bodily injury (R. 34). 
Bv wav of foundation it was established that there . . ' 
was a Fisher Body Se>1TirP l\Ianual pertaining to the 
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1966 model in the shop manager's office. Mr. Simpson 
knew of this and knew that the manual provided direc-
tions on dismantling cars (R. 320). This evidence was 
admissible to negate the allegation of no vvarning as 
well as to support the charge of contributory negligence 
based upon failure to make reasonable inquiry or to 
follow the directions set forth in the service manual. 
vVhen Exhibit 18 was offered, objection was made 
on the ground that it was not specifically called to the 
attention of the plaintiff or that he was instructed to 
:refer to it in connection with the operation which he 
performed (R. 159). When re-offered, counsel for the 
plaintiff said he had no objection except that it had not 
specifically been called to the attention of the plaintiff. 
(R. 175 ). 
The plaintiff was familiar with service, manuals 
but even if he -was not, it was proper for the jury to 
consider whether the service manual adequately apprised 
persons who might be removing parts from the car of 
the correct manner of doing so and whether the plaintiff 
should reasonably have ref erred to it. 
POINT V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
Instructions 13 and 4 set forth affirmatively the 
obligations of defendant manufacturer. Instruction No. 
16 stated the reverse of those instruction in this lan-
guage: 
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"An automobile manufacturer is not liable 
for injuriPs resulting when an automobile is used 
in a manner it was not intended to he used. 
"l\lerely because a product can be used dan-
gPrously or b<•causc a usPr can he subjected to 
a dangt>r does not make the product itself danger--
ous if it woul<l not he so while heing used as 
intended. . 
"A manufacturer is not required to fore,see 
all possible ways in which a person may injure 
himself nor to protect against all such possibil-
ities or against mismw hy careless persons." 
This instruction was based upon Section 165(1), 
l\f otor \yt>hick·s, of GO C .• T.8. 'vhich, beginning at page 
9:35, providPs: 
"A motor vehicle manufacturer is not an in-
surer, but is only required to exercise ordinary 
or reasonable care to see that the vehicle is rnadP. 
free from defects which might be reasonably ex-
pected to product> in,jury or damage. His duty 
is to design or construct his vehicle to be rPason-
ably safo or fit for the purpose for whieh it was 
madP, 'ldH•n used in he manner and for the pur-
pose for which it was supplied. . . . He is not 
under a duty to rnakE• automobiles fool-proof or 
aeei dent-proof. . . . " 
His duty extends to the ordinary 
of th<' vPhicle, and lw is not required to anti-
cipate and g-narcl against thP risk of injury to 
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those whose own acts or the acts of otlwrs might 
cause them injury, nor is he hound to anticipate 
and guard against the gross, careless misuse of 
the vehicle hy r0cklt>ss drivers." 
It is the duty of the trial judge where trial is by 
jury to instruct the jury upon the law applicable to the 
theories of both parties insofar as such theories are sup-
ported by competent evidencP. Hall v. Blackham, 18 
Utah 2d lG-1, -117 P. 2<l GG-1. 
The substantial evidence of Simpson's departure 
from the customary practice in automobile paint shops, 
his failure to heed what his own intuition told him, his 
falure to refer to the service manual or to make inquiry 
of the body shop men amply justified the court in giving 
Instruction No. 16 focusing the manufacturer's liability 
npon the product's ordinary and inknded nse. 
POINT VI. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18. 
In Instruction No. 18, the court explained the effect 
of contributory nPgligence. That Instruction read as fol-
lows: 
"Ev0n if vou were to find the defendant neg-
ligent and such negligence was a proximate 
cause of the accident, the plaintiff nevertheless 
may be barred from recov<>ring damages by con-
trihutory negligenC('. 
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"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that 
such negligence was a proximate and contributing 
cause of tlw arrident, then you verdict must be 
aainst the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, 
no cause of action whether or not you also found 
the defendant negligent in proximately contrib-
uting to the acrident.'' 
The defendant's Requested Instruction on contribu-
tory negligence eontained the speeifications of negligence 
dairnt>d by the defondant (H. O:Z). The eourt eliminated 
tlw specifieations after disrnssions with counsel. 
1' 1 l;· tli<' App<'llant now claims that the ins1rndion was too 
hroacl. He did not, however, request a limiting instruc-
tion. 
Tn Galaro1cicz n. vVarrl, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d 576 
( 19;) 1) the con rt instructed the jury that liability could 
not he imposed upon defendant \Varel rnerely because he 
ownPd the car nnless the relationship of principal and 
agent or master and sPrvant ('Xisted between him and 
his son. 
Cpon appeal, it was urged that the conrt erred in 
failing to define principal and agent and master and 
:-:c-1-yant arnl that the instruction 'vas too general. Ftah 
Court olm•rved that the plaintiff had not sub-
mittNl an:r reqrn•stc>d instrudions further defining 
t(•rms and s11.id that in the ahsenc<\ of his having done so, 
he cannot be ]ward to complain of the instruction given 
in ge1wral tf>nns. 
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Counsel for Simpson does not urge that evidence 
was received which was outside the scope of the Pretrial 
Order, that any argument of counsel "'as made outside 
the scope of the issues framed by the Pretrial Order or 
that the jury could reasonably have found contributory 
negligence on a ground not encompassed by the Pretrial 
Order. 
vVhy should '\Ve assume the jury found contributory 
negligence on a forbidden ground? All preswnptions are 
in favor of the validity of thr n'nlid Joseph I'. Orous, 
IDS H . ;f 1 1() lTt• 1 ') 1(' 1 "•o p ') 1 (JPQ()._). J. • • 08}J1 (/1, J ,l l _( cHc, tJ-t·<) JchJ J 
C( CLT 'SIOX 
rrhe Appellant in this cnse llkaded his caus0 of ac-
tion in negligence, stated his contentions at Pretrial in 
negligence, tried his case and submitted it to the jury 
relying upon negligence as the foundation of his right 
to relid. 
It "-as not until J udg111ent agai11st him had been 
e:ntered that he concluded it may have heen better to 
have sought to persuade the court to adopt the doctrine 
of strict liabilit>' as a few courts have dmlC'. 
If litigants may not change horses in the middle of 
the stream, with even greater forre, litigants may not 
change horses after they have aniroaehed tlw opposite 
bank. 
25 
It i:-; rnanif P:-;t that the of contributor:: neli-
w·nce \\·as proper!)- suhrnitted to tht> jury under tht• 
evid('llC<' :-;]10wn hy the reronl. 
The service manual was relevant to hoth the conduct 
of' tlw dt>fendant and the conduct of thP plaintiff. The 
instruetions correct statemPnts of the law. 
Jn no sense can it be said that the points complained 
of rise to the levt>l of irreversible error. 'I1he verdict 
of the jury should be upheld and the Judgment affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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